American University International Law Review
Volume 24
Issue 1 Academy on Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law International Human Rights Law and the
Protection of the Environment

Article 5

2008

Spoiling Movi's River: Towards Recognition of
Persecutory Environmental harm Within the
Meaning of the Refugee Convention
Carly Marcs

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Marcs, Carly. "Spoiling Movi's River: Towards Recognition of Persecutory Environmental harm Within the Meaning of the Refugee
Convention." American University International Law Review 24, no.1 (2008): 31-71.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

SPOILING MovI's RIVER: TOWARDS
RECOGNITION OF PERSECUTORY
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM WITHIN THE
MEANING OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION

CARLY MARCS*

IN TRO DU CTION .........................................................................
I. MINING AND ITS IMPACT: THE TOLUKUMA
EX PERIEN CE ........................................................................
II. CURRENT TREATY FRAMEWORK ..................................
A . INTERPRETATION ................................................................

32
35
37

38

B. AUTHORITATIVE CHARACTER OF THE UNHCR
HANDBOOK AND UNHCR GUIDELINES AND STATEMENTS .... 40
III. "OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY OF HIS ORIGIN" ................. 40
IV. "OWING TO A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF BEING
PERSECU TED "......................................................................
41
A. THE LAW OF A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR ............................... 41
B. MovI's WELL-FOUNDED FEAR ........................................... 43
C. W HAT IS PERSECUTION 9 ...................... .. . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . 45

1. Threat to Life ...............................................................
2. Deprivation of Economic and Social Rights ...............
3. O ther Social Rights ....................................................

*

47
50
51

The author is an Australian attorney who works as a criminal defence

lawyer with the Victorian Aboriginal Legal Service Co-operative, Ltd. She also

works as an attorney with the Flemington & Kensington Community Legal Centre
Inc. She holds a B.A. with a major in Philosophy, a LL.B. with Honours and is
currently completing a LL.M. in Public and International Law from the University
of Melbourne. This Article also benefitted from the work of the International
Journalof Refugee Law, whose editorial staff aided in the editing process.

AM. U. INT'L L. RE v.

[24:31

D. PERSECUTION BY WHOM? NON-STATE AGENTS OF
PERSECUTION .....................................................................

1. State Complicity: Unwilling to Protect .......................
2. State Complicity: Unable to Protect ............................
3. The Relevant Question: Does the State Protect? ......
V. CONVENTION GROUNDS: MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP ..........................................
A. PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS APPROACH ........................
B. SOCIAL PERCEPTION APPROACH .........................................
VI. "FOR REASONS OF," THE NEXUS CLAUSE ...................
A. THREE APPROACHES TO INTENTION ...................................
B. STANDARD OF CAUSATION .....................................................
CO N CLU SION ............................................................................

52

54
56
57
59

61
63
65

67
70
71

INTRODUCTION
Morris Movi belongs to a small community living in a remote
mountainous region of Papua New Guinea ("PNG"). ' For thousands
of years, generations of his family have lived in this area, in harmony
with nature. The Auga River, which runs through this land, used to
provide for the majority of his people's needs. The fish, eels and
prawns were so bountiful that his family never went hungry and his
community was spiritually enriched when traditional names were
given to the different species of fish and plant life.2 One day,
foreigners appeared on his land. They dug a massive hole in the
earth-a gold mine-and told him that he would benefit from what
they found. However, he did not. Instead, waste generated by the
mine was pumped directly into the river, which changed colour and
then, without warning, flooded. The fish became sick and died, as
did members of his community who continued to drink from the
river because there was no other water source. Movi's feet turned
yellow from crossing the river to reach his crops on the other side.
1. In this exercise the hypothetical refugee applicant shall be referred to as
'Movi.' This name is taken from the Oxfam Report on the Tolukuma Gold Mine.
INGRID MACDONALD, OXFAM AUSTRALIA, MINING OMBUDSMAN CASE REPORT:

TOLUKUMA

GOLD

MINE

12

(2004),

http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/

ombudsman/2004/cases/tolukuma/docs/fullreport.pdf.
2. Id. at 13 (explaining the spiritual and emotional effect of river pollution
from the mine on the local community).
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Helicopters flying overhead transporting supplies to the mine
dropped cyanide and diesel on his land. His people became desperate
and turned to alcohol and other vices in their despair. This led to
increased violence and social disharmony. Movi's appeals to his
government and to the mine operators were ignored.3
Movi's predicament is based on the actual circumstances of the
Yaloge, Fuyuge, Roro, Mekeo, Kuni and Tolukuma peoples, as
outlined in the Oxfam Mining Ombudsman report about the impact
of the Tolukuma Gold Mine ('TGM') on local communities.4 Movi's
story presents a compelling, hypothetical example of how a group
might suffer from persecution through harm inflicted by
environmental degradation perpetuated by mining companies.
Now imagine that out of desperation and fear of further harm,
Movi manages to leave his home. He arrives on the shores of another
country as a refugee and makes application for recognition of that
status, pursuant to the current international standard under the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees5 and the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees 6 (collectively, the "Convention").
This Article extrapolates from research into the impact of the
TGM in PNG. It presents an argument that an applicant fleeing the
harm generated by the mine could argue in order to claim asylum
under the Convention. This work considers what ought to occur in
international jurisprudence if a member of the affected community
managed to leave his home, arrive safely in a new state, and make a
claim for refugee status. Through a hypothetical application of the
Convention definition to a particular set of facts, this paper argues
that Movi and others like him already meet the requirements of the
Convention definition. This has broader implications for a potential
new category of refugees recognised for fleeing persecution in the
form of environmental degradation. 7 A 2005 report hypothesized that
3. Id.
4. See id. at 9-25 (describing the detrimental impact of the mine on health,
safety and food security).
5. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
150 [hereinafter Convention].
6. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Dec. 16, 1966, 606 U.N.T.S.
267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
7. See generally Convention, supra note 5. Other theorists have referred to

this category as "environmental refugees." That term will not be used in this article
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by 2010, global warming will have created approximately 50 million
environmental refugees 8 and by 2050 we can expect 200 million
environmental refugees due to rising sea levels alone.9 Relevantly,
development displacement stemming from economic activity, such
as the development of the TGM, affects more people every year than

displacement related to armed conflict and natural disasters.
This Article argues that while naturally occurring environmental
disasters are not sufficient to establish refugee status without some
level of persecution and lack of government protection, artificial
environmental harm, if sufficiently serious, can be persecutory.
Whether the persecutor is the state or a third party, if the harm is
inflicted upon the victim for reasons of their race, religion,
nationality, membership of particular social group, or political
opinion, then asylum obligations under the Convention might be
invoked if the environmental harm engenders a well-founded fear in
the applicant such that they are unable to avail themselves of the
protection of their country of origin." Nothing in international
refugee law explicitly rejects the notion that persecution may be
inflicted through environmental harm.' 2 Indeed, it is possible to draw
because it is erroneous. The Convention sets out who is and who is not a refugee
based on whether or not they meet the requirements of the definition and whether
any of the exclusion clauses apply. See infra Part Ill. The use of terms such as
"environmental refugee" or "economic migrant" is unhelpful because it attempts to
read supplementary exclusion clauses into the Convention. These shorthand terms
are not valid labels under the treaty.
8. See David Adam, 50m EnvironmentalRefugees by the End of the Decade,
UN Warns, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 12, 2005, at 24 (citing "rising sea
levels, desertification and shrinking freshwater supplies" along with the
displacement of 50 million individuals as consequences of global warming).
9. See Norman Myers, Environmentally-InducedDisplacements: The State of
the Art, in Symposium, Environmentally-Induced Population Displacements and
EnvironmentalImpacts Resultingfrom Mass Migration 56 GENEVA/IOM.UNHCR
(1996).
10. See CHRISTIAN AID SOCIETY, HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS

17 (May 2007) http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/Images/humantide3 _tcml523335.pdf (stating that while 15 million people are displaced per year due to
economic activity, the total number displaced at any given time is closer to 105
million due to the time it takes those displaced to resettle).
11. See infra Part II.
12. Cf Convention, supra note 5, arts. l(A)(2), 1(C)(6) (providing race,
religion, nationality and membership of particular social and political groups as
reasons for persecution and explaining that a refugee can still avail him or herself
of the Convention if he or she can invoke a compelling reason arising out of
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on binding international human rights instruments that lend support
to the notion that at least some of the world's environmentally
displaced people fall within the settled definition of a refugee. This
article, a highly fact-specific hypothetical example of a claim for
refugee status under the Convention, sets out precisely how one
group of environmentally displaced people already meet the
definition.
Part I of this Article draws on available sources of investigative
material concerning the effects of the TGM on local communities to
set out the factual basis for the hypothetical claim. Part II examines
the current legislative framework as set out in the Convention and
argues that an evolutionary approach to the interpretation of the
definition was envisaged by the drafters and is in line with accepted
principles of treaty interpretation. Part III turns to an application of
the facts to the key elements of the definition, beginning with the
requirement that an applicant be outside her or his country of origin.
Part IV examines the requirement that the refugee applicant possess a
''well-founded fear of persecution." Part V argues that the
hypothetical applicant is a "member of a particular social group" and
Part VI explores the necessary causal connection between that group
and the fear of persecution experienced by it. This Article then
concludes that the applicant should be granted refugee status under
the Convention.

I. MINING AND ITS IMPACT: THE TOLUKUMA
EXPERIENCE
"Forseven kilometresfrom the mine outfall, river life has been
destroyed. No adequate course of actionfrom the Government or
from Tolkuma Gold Mine has been taken. "1'3
Mine operators have an enormous impact on the lives and
environments of local communities, many of whom share similar
experiences despite their geographic separation. In many instances,
the affected areas are often home to remote and vulnerable
communities and report environmental degradation, human rights
persecution).
. 13.

TECHA BEAUMONT, MINERAL POLICY INSTITUTE, REPORT ON TOLUKUMA
CYANIDE
SPILL
(2000),
http://www.mpi.org.au/campaigns/cyanide/report_

tolukuma/.
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communities have no outlet for their grievances that frequently result
in community division, costly legal actions, and, sometimes, violent
conflict.' 5 The TGM is presently owned by Emperor Mines Limited
("EML") but from 1999 until 2006, it was owned by DRD Gold,
formerly Durban Roodeport Deep Ltd., listed on the Australian Stock
Exchange.' 6 Waste produced during the extraction process at the
TGM is dumped "into the Auga-Angabanga River system, upon
which downstream communities rely." ' 7
The surrounding communities have suffered great environmental
degradation due to the mine and its waste disposal practices. In 2000,
a helicopter delivering supplies to the mine dropped one tonne of
cyanide in the area. In 2001, community members wrote to the
Oxfam Mining Ombudsman requesting assistance because local
people complained of environmental pollution and its flow-on
effects.' 8 Locally, increased sedimentation has made the river more
difficult to cross and has caused flash flooding. '9 At least one
member of the community was allegedly swept away by such a
flood. 20 Difficult river crossings prevent community members from

14. Oxfam Australia, The Mining Ombudsman Project, http://www.oxfam.

org.au/campaigns/mining/ombudsman/index.htmIl (last visited June 10, 2008)
(enumerating a formal process for investigating allegations of human rights
violations).
15. Bougainville fights for freedom, Posting of Bougainville Freedom
Movement, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/24/047.html (May 26, 1996,
02:52:13 EDT) (explaining that by 1996, the seventh year of conflict between the
people of Bougainville and the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea, a
blockade designed to force reopening of a copper mine by depriving the people of
Bougainville of humanitarian aid had cost over 10,000 lives).
16. In Australasia, DRD Gold has a 78.72% interest in EML, the current

owners and operators of the TGM. EML is also listed on the Australian Stock
exchange. See DRD Gold Limited, Corporate Profile, http://www.drd.co.za/
about/profile.asp [hereinafter DRD Gold Limited]; see also MacDonald, supra

note 1, at 9.
17. See OXFAM AUSTRALIA, MINING OMBUDSMAN: CASE UPDATES 2005 4,

(Maureen Bathgate & Sarah Lowe eds., 2006) [hereinafter OXFAM CASE UPDATES,
2005] (stating that the waste tailings from the gold have negatively affected human
as well as animal life).
18. See id. "The mine dumps over 160,000 tonnes of mine waste directly into
the Auga-Angabanga River annually." Id.
19. See id.
20. See Macdonald, supra note 1,at 9.
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accessing their gardens and forests used for food and building
supplies. Community members attribute illness and deaths to
drinking and washing in the river. Further, the river's fish stock has
been depleted by the pollution, threatening the local food supply.21
The local indigenous communities believe that these factors have led
to "increased social problems, including alcoholism and violence. "22

II. CURRENT TREATY FRAMEWORK
Refugee advocates share a common misapprehension that asylum
seekers have a right to asylum under the current international refugee
regime. In fact, there is no general "right to asylum" under
international law, but Movi does have a "right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution. 2' 3 That principle is
enshrined in the foundational international human rights instrument,
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), that set the
political stage for the Convention.24 The Convention remains the
functional core of international refugee law. 25 It defines a refugee as
any person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country .

..- Importantly, the
".

definition does not contain the words, 'having been formally
recognised.' Any person who satisfies the conditions of article
1(A) (2) is a refugee irrespective of whether or not she or he has been
formally recognised as such under municipal law and so

21. See OXFAM CASE UPDATES, 2005, supranote 17, at 5.
22. See Macdonald, supra note 1, at 9.
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), art. 14
(emphasis added) [hereinafter UDHR].
24. See id.art. 14.
25. See generally Convention, supra note 5. The Convention is enforceable in
signatory states where it has been incorporated in domestic law. Id.
26. See Convention, supra note 5, art. l(A)(2). The 1951 definition included
both temporal and optional geographical limits which were removed by the 1967

Protocol. Omitting the words 'as a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951' and the reference to Europe, the definitions are identical. Therefore, any
reference to the Convention in this essay is also a reference to the Protocol. See
also 1967 Protocol, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
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"[r]ecognition of his refugee status does not therefore make him a
refugee but declares him to be one. 27
The Convention definition of refugee can be broadly divided into
three parts: the inclusion clauses, which set out the affirmative
elements of a successful claim for refugee status;2 8 the cessation
29
clauses, which define when a person has ceased to be a refugee;
and the exclusion clauses, which demarcate when a person is
ineligible for recognition of refugee status because of some other
aspect of his or her record." All three elements of the definition will
be relevant to a claim for refugee status but the cessation and
exclusion provisions only arise once it has been established that an
applicant meets the initial requirements. This paper will focus on the
inclusion clauses, as set out in article I(A) (2), and argue that Movi
meets the initial prerequisites because he is fleeing persecution in the
form of environmental harm.
Importantly, the Convention contains a regime of rights to which a
refugee is entitled once formal recognition of her or his status has
been conferred. It is important to bear in mind that, in our
hypothetical example, Movi seeks to access these rights granted to
him under the Convention on the basis that he no longer has these
rights in his country of origin.
A. INTERPRETATION
States and tribunals may vary in their approaches to interpretation
and application of the Convention. However, they are all guided by
binding principles of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 ("VCLT"). 3 1 The VCLT
27. See Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
Under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook on

Procedures].
28. Convention, supra note 5, art. I(A) (inclusion).
29. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(C) (cessation).
30. See Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1(D), I(E) (exclusion) (providing for
the application of refugee status to persecuted individuals in the first section and
disqualified persons in the final four sections). For example, if an applicant is
found to have committed a serious non-political crime. See Convention, supra
note 5, art. l(F)(b).
31. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
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requires treaties to be interpreted in good faith with reference to their
object, purpose and context as well as to developments subsequent to
their conclusion.32 Using the principles of the VCLT, most scholars
agree that the Convention is of a humanitarian character, albeit
underscored by the practical purpose of burden sharing.33 The
preamble makes this evident by "recognizing the social and
humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees" and expressing a
"profound concern" for their plight.34 The United Nations also
articulates an intention to assure refugees the "widest possible
exercise" of rights and freedoms enjoyed under the UDHR. 35 In
Wang v Ministerfor Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs, Justice
Merkel of the Australian Federal Court found "the term 'refugee' in
the Convention: 'is, . . . to be understood as written against the

background of international human rights law, including as reflected
or expressed in the [UDHR] (esp. Arts 3, 5, and 16) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (esp. Arts 7,
23). "'36 An evolutionary approach must be adopted when
interpreting the Convention definition and applying it to
contemporary and emerging refugee flows. Precisely because of the
humanitarian nature of the Convention, "a Court cannot endorse
actions that are a violation of human rights by the standards of the
time merely because they are taken under a treaty which dates back
to a period when such action was not a violation of human rights. 37
Terms such as "persecution" used in the Convention are inherently
evolutionary and therefore only an evolutionary approach to
interpretation will give effect to the intended purpose of the treaty.

32. Id. art. 31.
33. Eiko R. Thielemann, Burden Sharing: The InternationalPolitics of Refugee
Protection 2-3 (Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Working Paper No.

134, 2006) (explaining in the context of refugee law that refugee burdens in
industrial states are unequal and a market-based policy driven by quotas could
prove to be an equitable and effective means of creating a humanitarian
international refugee law).
34. See Convention, supra note 5, pmbl.

35. See id.
36. Wang v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2000) F.C.A.
511 (Austl.) (citing Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,
(1997) 190 C.L.R. at 254 (Austl.)).
37. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 114 (Sept.

25) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
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B. AUTHORITATIVE CHARACTER OF THE UNHCR HANDBOOK
UNHCR GUIDELINES AND STATEMENTS

AND

In addition to interpretation of the Convention proper, there is
increasing recognition that a thorough analysis and application of the
Convention must also take into account the U.N. High Commission
for Refugees ("UNHCR") handbook and guidelines.3" In recent
years, some courts, including the English High Court, have invoked
Article 35(1) 39 of the Convention when quoting directly from various
UNHCR materials:40 "having regards to Article 35(1) of the
Convention, it seems to me that such Guidelines should be accorded
considerable weight. ' 41 The interpretation of the UNHCR Handbook
on Procedures is increasingly important to the interpretation of
refugee status under the Convention.

III. "OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY OF HIS ORIGIN"
In order to claim protection under the Convention, the applicant
must be, outside his or her country of origin. 42 There are no
exceptions to this rule. As previously discussed, this is because the
Convention is primarily concerned with giving rights to refugees
who would otherwise have no rights as aliens and non-citizens. It
follows that "[i]ntemational protection cannot come into play as long
as a person is within the territorial jurisdiction of his home
country. '43 Thus, for the purpose of this examination, it must be

38. Walter Kalin, Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of

Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond, in

REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL

UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 613,
627 (Erika Feller, Volker Tfirk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
39. Convention, supra note 5, art. 35(1) (stating that "[t]he Contracting States
undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner

LAW:

for Refugees ... in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its
duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.").
40. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27,
12(iii) (including
UNHCR statements regarding questions of law, or conclusions by the Executive
Committee of the High Commissioner's programme).
41.

R v. Uxbridge Magistrates' Court and Another, ex parte Adimi (1999) 4 All

ER 520 (Q.B.) (U.K.).
42. Convention, supra note 5, art. I(A)(2) (specifying those refugees who have

a well founded fear of being persecuted because of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion).

43. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27,

88.
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assumed that Movi has somehow managed to leave his home, travel
overseas and arrive safely in another state."

IV. "OWING TO A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF
BEING PERSECUTED"
Movi must also demonstrate that he holds a "well-founded fear of
being persecuted" to qualify for protection under the Convention. 5
This phrase lies at the heart of the refugee definition. Importantly, it
incorporates both subjective and objective elements.
A. THE LAW OF A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

On its face, the fear element is the easiest to satisfy'. It is of
particular significance for claimants seeking refuge from
environmental harm because the standard excludes other reasons for
flight. For instance, those fleeing famine or environmental disaster
are excluded from the definition unless they can show that the
famine was a means of persecution or they also have a "well-founded
fear of persecution for one of the reasons stated. ' 46 Even dire, lifethreatening environmental disasters do not necessarily engender a
fear of persecution. It is that fear alone that is relevant to the
Convention definition. Claims based merely on flight from
environmental disaster are therefore excluded from the Convention at
this preliminary stage. However, claimants like Movi can show a fear
of persecution because their government refuses to protect them from
damages caused by the mines. Unlike environmental disasters, which
are outside of the government's control, allowing the mining
companies to degrade the surrounding environment is directly within
the control of the government.

44. This element of the facts presented for analysis is the only part which is
fictitious. All other facts pertaining to the applicant are the result of research into
the TGM and its impact on local communities. See Macdonald, supra note 1.

Further, questions of whether internally displaced people ought to be eligible for
refugee status are not the focus of this work.
45. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(A)(2).
46. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27, 39 (assuming that most
people would not abandon their home and country without a compelling reason).
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Next, an "ordinary meaning" approach to interpretation 4 reveals
that fear, a subjective emotion, must be supported by the objective
standard of being "well-founded." The incorporation of a subjective
element in the definition places an emphasis on the particular state of
mind, disposition and credibility of the applicant. This is combined
with an objective standard requiring decision-makers to conduct a
balancing exercise that gives equal weight to the state of mind of the
applicant and the relevant background situation. Accordingly, the
subjective fear that Movi feels cannot be considered in a vacuum, it
must be supported by an objective situation. An applicant's fear is
well-founded if a state party establishes "there is a significant risk
' 48
that the applicant may be persecuted.
Precisely what meets this evidentiary burden has been the subject
of much debate. Earlier approaches involving a 'balance of
probabilities test' 49 have now been largely rejected in favour of a
more generous 'reasonable possibility' standard as articulated by
Justice Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court in Immigration and
NaturalizationService v Cardoza-Fonseca:
There is simply no room in the United Nations definition for
concluding that because an applicant has a 10% chance of
being . . . persecuted, that he or she has no 'well founded
fear' of the event happening . ... [S]o long as an objective
situation is established by the evidence, it need not be shown
that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is
enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility. 10

47. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, at 340 (requiring interpretation to be
done in terms of the treaty within context and in light of its purpose).
48. Colloquy, The Michigan Guidelines on Well-founded Fear, 26 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 493, 497 (2005) [hereinafter The Michigan Guidelines] (clarifying that a
chance or remote possibility of persecution is insufficient to establish well founded

fear).
49. See Kwiatkowsky v. Minister of Manpower & Immigration [1982] 2 SCR
856 (Can.).
50. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440
(1986) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 453
(1983)). This standard was also adopted by the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal
in Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1989] 2 F.C. 680.

Similarly, Professor Hathaway surmises that because the risk of persecution is
impossible to definitively measure, "decision-makers should ask only whether the
evidence as a whole discloses a risk of persecution which would cause a
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To establish that flight based on environmental harm is flight
based on a well-founded fear of persecution, Movi needs to point to
more than merely generalized environmental degradation in his
country of origin. He must present evidence of severe environmental
harm that has the reasonable probability of posing a serious threat to
him and his community, thereby inducing fear.
B. MOVI'S WELL-FOUNDED FEAR

Since the TGM commenced operating near his home in 1994,
Movi has endured a number of calamities and direct threats to his life
which at least show a reasonable possibility of persecution. Instead
of containing its waste on land, TGM dumps contaminated mine
tailings into Iwu Creek, which runs into the Auga River.5
Substantial quantities of mine waste and rock, otherwise known as
'overburden,' are also dumped into the Auga River via failing waste
dumps that erode over time." TGM opted for this cost effective yet
outdated practice of riverine tailings disposal even though the
company was warned that the resulting high levels of sedimentation
within the river would likely destroy fish habitats and food resources.
Clearly, this waste disposal method alone disclosed a 'reasonable
possibility' of inflicting serious harm. In practice this disposal
method has destroyed food resources and access to safe drinking
water. In January 2004, the Oxfam Mining Ombudsman found
"genuine fear expressed" in the concerns of Movi and community
members who described how their health has been damaged by
TGM's dumping practices.53 Downstream communities along the
Auga River describe swollen stomachs, open sores, yellowed skin,
and death related to the river.54 An increase in illness correlates to
the increased drinking of river water during the dry season, further
implicating the polluted water in the sickness the community
reasonable person in the claimant's circumstances to reject as insufficient whatever
protection her state or origin is able and willing to afford her." JAMES HATHAWAY,
THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 80 (1991) (fearing that "decision makers may be
inclined to use precise though arbitrary risk thresholds").
51. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that on a yearly basis EML

discharges more than 160,000 tonnes of mine tailings into the creek).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 11 (noting also that since 2001 over fifty people have died of
unexplained causes).
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suffers. 5 Mercury levels in the Auga River downstream of TGM's
mining operation are unacceptably high.56 Evidently, Movi and
community members now live in fear of the natural environment that
is also their home because of the polluted Auga River.
Fear amongst the affected communities was also galvanized in
2000 when a helicopter transporting cyanide to the mine dropped a
one-tonne bale from its load." Pellets plummeted through the canopy
of the PNG rainforest and landed 20 meters away from a stream.58
Until the arrival of Greenpeace Australia and the Mineral Policy
Institute, the mine operator 59 publicly claimed that recovery of the
cyanide and the removal of contaminated topsoil had been
completed.6" When Greenpeace did arrive, they found no evidence of
any cleanup and plenty of contamination. 61 In this cover-up, the
mining company was prepared to expose local inhabitants to a
dangerous and potentially life threatening chemical rather than admit
any liability. In these circumstances, a reasonable person would
clearly fear the actions of this company.
Moreover, Movi can point to the "reasonable possibility" that this
sort of practice will continue. The amount of tailings dumped into the
river rose between 2000 and 2004, to an average of 14,000 tonnes
per month.62 TGM hopes to continue to operate the mine and
introduce new resources to increase capacity.63 Increased production
55. Id.
56. Id. (revealing Unisearch's finding that the fish contained an excess of
mercury by the standards of Australia and the New Zealand Food Authority
(ANZFA) and the PNG Office of Environment and Conservation similarly found
unacceptably high mercury levels).
57. Beaumont, supra note 13 (showing that iron cyanide was found around the

crash site).
58. Id. (indicating that enough cyanide entered the stream to raise the level of
cyanide in the water to 25 times the US limit of .2ppm for drinking water).
59. DRD Gold Limited, supra note 16.
60. Beaumont, supra note 13 (documenting Dome's claim that visual
inspection yielded no detectable contamination).

61. Id. (detailing consequences to the community downstream).
62. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 11 (providing figures indicating that TGM
discharged 100,000 tons of tailings in 2000 and 168,000 tons in 2004).
63. Id. (quoting DRD Gold Limited, supra note 16) (indicating that "with

present reserves, the mine can expect to remain operating for at least another six to
eight years, but with the introduction of the new underground diamond head drill,

it is hoped (and expected) that the mine could be going for at least 10 years and
hopefully longer.").
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will bring commensurate increases in tailings disposal and river
contamination, and inevitably increases in pollution and destruction
of resources on which the local communities rely.64
In these circumstances, it is possible to conclude that Movi has a
well-founded fear of deliberate acts perpetuated by TGM which
cause environmental harm. This is not a case of accidental
environmental disaster and so Movi's claim cannot be dismissed at
this preliminary stage. However, some courts and tribunals may take
issue with the question of whether the harm Movi earnestly fears
rises to the level of "persecution" as delineated under the
Convention.
C. WHAT IS PERSECUTION?

The meaning of persecution, though a central term to determine
refugee status, is not defined by the Convention. After more than
fifty-six years, there is still no international consensus on a
definition. 65 The fact that the framers of the Convention chose not to
define the term evinces an intention to allow international refugee
law to respond to new circumstances, not yet contemplated at the
time of drafting. This may be in part due to an appreciation of the
limitless ways in which human beings may inflict harm upon one
another. The lack of an explicit definition of the term protects those
who might be subjected to forms of persecution inadvertently
excluded from the definition. Practically speaking, the vagueness of
the definition affords states that are party to the treaty greater
manoeuvrability in refugee status determination.66
However, there is international agreement about one aspect of
persecution under the Convention. Under Articles 31 and 33 of the
Convention, it is generally accepted that a threat to life or freedom on
account of a Convention ground will always amount to persecution.67
64. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 11 (describing the consequences for

downstream communities).
65. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Isaacs, Note, The Torch Dims: The Ambiguity of
Asylum and the "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" Standardin Sadeghi v. iNS,

20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 721, 721-22 (1995) (noting a vague interpretation
of the term "persecution" under U.S. law).
66. Cf ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE

STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW, 193 (vol. 1, 1966).
67. Convention, supra note 5, arts. 31, 33 (forbidding a contracting state from
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This interpretation of the term has found acceptance in common law
jurisdictions," amongst noted international refugee law scholars,69
7" Adopting this
and in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures.
interpretation, Movi can demonstrate that the harm he has endured
has constituted a threat to his life. The contamination of the Auga
River, Movi's only source of water, poses a direct threat to his life.
He must either use water containing unacceptable levels of heavy
metals" and face risk of poisoning,7 2 or he must go without water
entirely. Either way, the result is a serious risk to his health and his
survival.
The existence of the mine and the riverine tailings disposal method
has also made the Auga River deadly in other ways. Locals have
described the advent of flash flooding along the Auga River. For
example, Muluvi Eleli alleges that TGM's release of mine waste that
was blocking the flow of water upstream caused flash flooding that
killed his daughter.73 Movi also endured threats to his life as a result
of cyanide spills in 2000 and again in 2003 when 4,000 litres of
74
diesel fuel was dropped in transit to TGM.
These avoidable accidents, coupled with the threat of drowning,
poisoning, or slow starvation to which Movi is now exposed,
constitute a threat to his life. This threat, however, has not yet been
contemplated in the context of international refugee law. In that
returning a refugee to a persecuting country); see also UNHCR Handbook on
Procedures, supra note 30, 51 (citing Convention, supra note 5, art. 33).
68. See, e.g., Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169
CLR 379, 426 (Austl.). (finding that a threat to life or freedom is generally
accepted as persecution under the Convention).

69. See

ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN,

supra note 66 (acknowledging that even those

who interpret persecution strictly agree that loss of life or freedom constitutes

persecution).
70. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27,

51 (noting that other
serious violations of human rights would constitute persecution).
71. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 12 (finding that "water quality investigations
carried out during 2002 by PNG civil society organisation NEWG also found
unacceptable levels of certain heavy metals in the Auga River").
72. Id. (stating that "other reports from nurses at the St. Gerard's School of
Nursing documented health concerns and 19 unexplained deaths"). They claim that
the skin colour of the people turned yellow before they died, possibly indicative of

poisoning. Id.
73. Id. at 13.
74. Id. at 16 (highlighting the efforts of the people to seek compensation for
physical and psychological impacts).
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milieu, a threat to one's life is usually recognised as a verbal or
physical threat of murder expressed by one person or group to
another, acts of violence and intimidation and. other forms of
harassment." And yet, there is nothing in the Convention that
suggests that the threat to life endured by Movi could not also be
persecution if it fulfils the other requirements of the definition.
1. Threat to Life
In support of his claim that the above examples constitute a threat
to life and, therefore, persecution, Movi must draw on standards
established in binding international human rights treaties. The
predominant approach to the interpretation of persecution, at least in
common law jurisdictions,7 6 has been to equate it with violations of
international human rights norms codified in binding international
treaties such as the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights77 ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights78 ("ICESCR"). This approach
is justified by the VCLT, which references the preamble of a treaty
as revealing the treaty's context, object, and purpose.79 In
establishing the purpose of the Convention, the preamble highlights
that "the Charter of the United Nations and [the UDHR] . . .have
affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental
rights and freedoms without discrimination."8 0 This reference to the

75. See, e.g., Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)

(describing severe harassment, threats, violence and discrimination against an
Israeli Arab and his family that amounted to persecution); Shah v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 220 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2000) (detailing how the
applicant's politically active husband was killed and the applicant and her family

were repeatedly threatened in India).
76. Michelle Foster emphasises that the "need for some objective guidance has
underpinned the development of the human rights approach to interpreting the
Refugee Convention, which is now dominant in the common law world, and
increasingly accepted in many civil law jurisdictions as well." MICHELLE FOSTER,
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SocIo-ECONOMIc RIGHTS: REFUGE FROM
DEPRIVATION 87-88 (2007).

77. International Convention and Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].

78. International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
79. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 31.
80. Convention, supra note 5, pmbl.
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UDHR is telling and instructive. 8 ' Indeed, the language of the
Convention definition mimics the UDHR in "[giving] attention to

five basic freedoms: freedom from persecution on account of (1)
race, (2) religion, (3) nationality, (4) membership of a particular
social group and (5) political opinion.

' 82

Therefore, as a matter of

treaty interpretation, applicants and decision-makers must look
towards this foundational human rights text for guidance.83 The
VCLT also requires consideration of "any relevant rules of

international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 8 4
Since most signatory states are also parties to the U.N. General
Assembly, which approved the UDHR on December 10, 1948, the
UDHR should be considered a relevant rule of international law.
Importantly, the UDHR, echoed by the remaining instruments of
the International Bill of Human Rights, provides that "everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person. '8 5 Though originally
the right to life and security was probably aimed at preventing

arbitrary killing by governments, the environmental facets of the
rights to life and security of the person have since been broadly
recognised by noted scholars and in international jurisprudence.86 In
81. It is fair to assume that the Convention would have considered rights
granted under the ICCPR and ICESCR if those treaties were in existence in 1951.
Cf Jessica B. Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements
of the Refuge Definition, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 480, 490 (1998) (arguing that the
Convention "relied on the human rights foundation laid by the Universal
Declaration").
82. Cooper, supra note 81, at 490 (highlighting the fact that the five freedoms
protected by the refugee definition in the Convention are protected in several
articles of the UDHR); see also UDHR, supra note 23, arts. 2, 18, 19, 20.
83. Importantly, environmental rights and the right to life are also contained in
more recent binding international treaties. Fundamental rights such as the "right to
the highest attainable standard of health" enshrined in the ICESCR and the right to
life enshrined in the ICCPR depend on a clean and healthy environment. See
ICCPR, supra note 77, art. 6, 1 ("Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
1 ("The State Parties ...recognize the
life."); ICESCR, supra note 78, art. 12,
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health").
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 31, art. 31(3)(c).
85. UDHR, supra note 23, art. 3.
86. Cf Cooper, supra note 81, at 495-97 (highlighting that the 1969
Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of
Refugee Problems in Africa and 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees
expanded the refugee definition to include people fleeing internal tensions and
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addition, Article 25 of the UDHR provides humans worldwide "the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family including food ... the right to security in
the event of unemployment . . . or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control."87
The comprehensive language of these provisions set "broad
environmental standards and creat[e] an implicit human right to
freedom
from
life-threatening
and
otherwise
intolerable
8
environmental conditions." The environmental aspects of the right
to life are broadly acknowledged: scholars suggest that
"environmental problems that endanger life--directly or indirectlyimplicate" the right to life.8 9 Further, "established human rights
standards which do not directly touch upon environmental issues
may house an implicit relevance capable of judicial development.
The right to life, for example, may be deemed to be infringed where
a state fails to abate the emission of highly toxic products into
supplies of drinking water." 9 Human rights scholar Professor Dinah
Shelton opines that "a safe and healthy environment may be viewed
either as a pre-condition to the exercise of existing rights or as
inextricably intertwined with the enjoyment of' the right to life. 9
In his opinion in the Gabaikovo-Nagymaros Case, Judge
Weeremantry lends support to the notion that a clean and safe
environment is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other rights:

civil disturbances).
87. UDHR, supra note 23, art. 25.
88. Cooper, supra note 81, at 492.
89. Neil A.F. Popovi6, In Pursuit of Environmental Human Rights:
Commentary on the Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 487, 515 (1996).
90. Michael Anderson, Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Law: An
Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1, 7
(Alan E. Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996).
91. Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to
Environment, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 105 (1991).
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The protection of the environment is . . . a vital part of

contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non
for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the
right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this,
as damage to the environment can impair and undermine all
the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and
other human rights instruments.92
Hence, there is persuasive authority for the principle that
environmental rights are a prerequisite to fundamental human rights,
especially the right to life. The facts outlined above offer conclusive
evidence that Movi has endured and will continue to endure serious
threats to his life in the form of environmental harm. It follows then
that Movi has well-founded fear of "persecution."
2. Deprivation of Economic and Social Rights

In the unlikely event that Movi failed to establish a serious threat
to his life amounting to "persecution" through the above examples,
he could demonstrate that his experiences amount to persecution by
highlighting that his economic and social rights have been violated.
It must be acknowledged that measures which are not in themselves
persecutory can be combined with other factors to "produce an effect
on the mind of the applicant that can reasonably justify a claim to
well-founded fear of persecution on 'cumulative grounds.' 93 Indeed,
the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures confirms that "other serious
violations of human rights-for the same reasons-would also
' 94
constitute persecution."
Though an in depth discussion of "persecution" as the deprivation
of socio-economic rights is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
important to note that the destruction of Movi's environment could
constitute a denial of his rights under both the UDHR and ICESCR.
For example, article 23 of the UDHR describes the fundamental right

92. Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 91-92
(Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry).
93. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27, 53; see also Korablina
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 158 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 1998)
(finding persecution where Ukrainian Jew witnessed violent attacks and suffered
extortion, harassment, and threats by anti-Semitic ultra-nationalists).
94. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27, 51.
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of all people to work and to "free choice of employment, to just and
favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment."9 5 Similarly, article 6(1) of the ICESCR recognises
the right to work "which includes the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or
accepts. ' 96 In her overview of the connection between the
deprivation of economic and social rights and persecution, Professor
Foster relies on US and UK authority 97 to assert that "decisionmakers have recognized that there is no necessary correlation
between the nature of harm ...and the gravity of the impact upon an
individual. 9 8 Foster points out that it is now generally accepted that
cases involving an absolute denial of the right to employment "are
considered sufficiently serious to warrant characterisation as
persecution."99 Pertinently, as a subsistence farmer, Movi depends
entirely on the natural environment and upon the Agua River for his
livelihood. Without it, he faces unemployment and slow starvation.
3. Other Social Rights
The impact of the river pollution is also felt emotionally and
spiritually by the communities. 0 Arguably, where direct and
specific environmental harms destroy the cultural existence of a
group, this may amount to "persecution." This sort of harm must
have been contemplated by Justice McHugh of Australia's High
Court when he found that "measures 'in disregard' of human dignity
may, in appropriate cases, constitute persecution ....[P]ersecution.

95. UDHR, supra note 23.
96. ICESCR, supra note 78.
97. See Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1961) (finding "the denial of

an opportunity to earn a livelihood... is the equivalent of a sentence of death by
means of slow starvation") (citations omitted); Secretary of State for the Home
Dep't v. Sijakovic (Unreported, U.K. IAT, Appeal No. HX-58113-2000, 1 May

2001), 16) (stating that "the harm need not result from violence or loss of liberty.
An inability to earn a living or to find anywhere to live can result in destitution and
at least potential damage to health and even life."); see also Foster, supra note 76,
at 92
98. Foster, supra note 76, at 92.

99. Id. at 94.
100. Macdonald, supra note 1, at 13. "The sacred sites in the river are now
covered by sediment and the aquatic life in the river is almost gone. The elders
grieve for their children and grandchildren who are losing their traditions and
identity." Id.
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•. has historically taken many forms of social, political and economic

discrimination." 101
D. PERSECUTION BY WHOM? NON-STATE AGENTS OF
PERSECUTION
"The nature of Persecution is changing...

102

Movi's claim involves a fear of persecution perpetuated most
directly by non-state actors. Currently, it is EML, a company listed
on the Australian Stock Exchange, that is polluting the Auga River
and destroying the surrounding environment. Whether or not
persecution carried out by non-state actors constitutes persecution as
defined by the Convention has been the subject of debate." 3 The
UNHCR Handbook on Procedures says that while "persecution is
normally related to action by the authorities of a country . . . it may
also emanate from sections of the population . . . if [the acts of
persecution] are knowingly tolerated by the authorities, or if the
10 4
authorities refuse, or prove unable, to offer effective protection."'
The guideline contained in the UNHCR Handbook on Procedures
has been accepted by most common law jurisdictions.101
Conversely, civil law jurisdictions have been more divided and
tend to require some level of accountability of the state. Proponents
of the accountability view argue that persecution is the abuse of state
power and therefore only states or agents of the state can
101. Chan v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 C.L.R. 379,
36 (Austl.).
102. Walter Kalin, Non-State Agents of Persecutionand the Inability of the State
to Protect, 15 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 415, 415 (2001) (commenting on the increasing
perpetration of persecution by non-state actors).
103. Alice Edwards, Age and Gender Dimensions in InternationalRefugee Law,
in, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 46, 59 (Erika Feller, Volker
Tdrk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
104. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures, supra note 27, 65.
105. See Edwards, supra note 103, at 59 n.75 (citing Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs v. Ibrahim, High Court of Australia, [2000] HCA 5, 26
Oct. 2000; Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),
Canadian Federal Court of Appeal, [1991] 3 FC 605; Canada (Attorney General) v.
Ward, Supreme Court of Canada, [1993] 2 SCR 689; Adan v. Sec'y of State for the
Home Dep't, UK House of Lords, [1999] 1 AC 293; Horvath v. Sec'y of State for
the Home Dep't, House of Lords, [2000] 3 All ER 577)) (showing acceptance of
the protection view in Australia, Canada and the U.K.).

2008]

SPOILING MO vi'S RIVER

persecute. 10 6 An interpretation of the Convention based on the
principles of the VCLT does not support this approach because the
Convention does not stipulate the source or the agent of harm. The
notion of persecution is qualified only by the words "for reasons of,"
placing an emphasis on the motivation for the persecution and
remaining silent on the identity of the persecutor. 07 The principle of
non-refoulement contained in the Convention is also silent on the
role of the state.10 Scholars have noted that "to read a requirement of
State accountability into the refugee definition 'would in essence
formulate an additional requirement, which was not foreseen
originally and cannot be justified with reference to the actual
wording of the refugee definition."" 9
Crucially, the definition does contain a reference to state
protection.' " Proponents of the view that the persecutor does not
need to be the state acknowledge the necessary absence of state
protection against the harm feared."' It follows that the requirement
in the refugee definition that the applicant be unable or unwilling to
avail himself of state protection is satisfied when a country of origin
is unable to offer sufficient protection. In those circumstances,

106. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court]
Aug. 6, 1996, 101 Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [BVerwGE]
328 (331-32, 335-36) (F.R.G.) (dismissing an asylum claim by Bosnian Muslims
because, among other things, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not persecute
them); BVerwG Jan. 18, 1994, 95 BVerwGE 42 (45) (asserting that "[p]olitical

persecution is fundamentally state-run persecution").
107. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(A)(2) ("the term 'refugee' shall apply
to any person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion...").
108. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 33.
109. See Klin, supra note 102, at 418 (citing GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL,
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE

367 (Oxford 1996)); Ben Vermeulen et al.,

Persecution by Third Parties (University of Nijmegen, Centre for Migration Law,
May 1998), availableat http://www.ecre.org/research/nsagents.html; Volker Ttirk,
Non-State Agents of Persecution (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal)).
110. See Convention, supra note 5, art. l(A)(2) ("the term 'refugee' shall apply

to any person who ...is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country
•..").
111. See Edwards, supra note 103, at 59-60 (highlighting that most common law

countries accept that non-state actors can be persecutors, while some civil law
countries require some state accountability if a non-state actor is the persecutor).
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citizens will be both unable and unwilling to avail themselves of that
1 12

ineffective protection.

The absence of state protection is a vital element in making out a
claim of Convention persecution.1 3 In essence, "persecution equals
serious harm plus the failure of state protection."' 1 4 In Ministerfor
Immigration and MulticulturalAffairs v. Khawar, the High Court of
Australia found the failure of State protection is the necessary
"bridge between persecution by the state and persecution by nonstate agents which is necessary in the interests of consistency of the
whole scheme." ' In granting refugee status to Mrs. Khawar, a
victim of domestic violence who was refused assistance by the
police, the court found that a state's refusal to protect its citizen
evinced not only an "inability to provide protection," but also,
"alleged tolerance and condonation." " 6
1. State Complicity: Unwilling to Protect
Khawar is analogous to Movi's case where there is evidence of the
state's inability and unwillingness to offer protection. " Mining and
oil comprise a large part of the Papuan government's economic

112. Kilin, supra note 102, at 423 (asserting that the Convention in Article

1(A)(2) requires a refugee to have a well-founded fear of persecution and be
unable to obtain state protection if he remains in his country of origin).
113. See infra Parts III-IV.
114. See Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] N.Z.R.S.A.A.

67; see also Ex

Parte Shah, (1999) 2 A.C. 629, 638 (U.K.H.L.) (pointing out that an applicant for
asylum must prove that she cannot obtain state protection from persecution);
Horvath v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (2002) 3 W.L.R. 379, 382
(U.K.H.L.) (reasoning that in a case where a person persecuted by a non-state actor
raises the issue of whether his unwillingness to obtain state protection or his fear of
being persecuted is sufficient to qualify for asylum).
115. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar [2002] H.C.A.
14. (Austl.) 19 (Gleeson, C.J.) (citing Horvath 3 W.L.R. at 497-98 (Lord Hope of
Craighead)).
116. Khawar, [2002] H.C.A. 14 at 30.
117. What amounts to "protection" in the sense of sufficiency of state protection
against persecution by non-state actors has not yet been fully established in
relevant case law. Compare Edwards, supra note 103, at 63 (suggesting that
"[c]lear and convincing confirmation of its inability to protect its citizens seems to
be the standard in order to rebut the presumption that, absent a complete
breakdown of State apparatus, the state is capable of protecting its citizens"), with
Cooper, supra note 81, at 507 (relaxing Edwards' test and suggesting that mere
government negligence can justify flight from a country of origin).
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development policy, and as a result environmental protection is
ancillary to economic production."' 8 The PNG government has a
vested economic interest in ultimately ensuring that the TGM
operates efficiently, even if it must sacrifice safety. Accordingly, the
government provides security assistance to the mine operators.
Locals report that the TGM is flanked by members of the National
Police Force. 119 Those adversely affected by the mine's activity are a
small group, whose problems are a hundred kilometres away from
the government in Port Moresby. The PNG government is not
motivated to relinquish any economic benefits in order to protect
those affected because they are members of a particular social group
who do not figure prominently in government agenda. This is
evinced by the sheer lack of effective regulation of the mining sector
and the absence of state protection from the harm it produces.
In contrast, other governments are prepared to hold companies
such as EML and DRD Gold accountable for the harm they cause.
Recently, upon a Council on Ethics recommendation, the Norwegian
Ministry of Finance excluded DRD Gold from the Norwegian
Government Pension Fund-Global because of its activities at the
TGM.120 Norway's reaction to the activities of EML and DRD stands

118. Colin Filer & Benedict Imbun, A Short History Of Mineral Development
Policies In PapuaNew Guinea 2 (Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program,
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University,

Working Paper No 55, 2004) ("[T]he mining industry currently accounts for about
50% of the country's exports and 20% of its Gross Domestic Product, while the oil
industry has been contributing half as much again."). Michael Booth & Alyssa
Bleck, Mining in Papua New Guinea, Ted Case Studies, 1996,

http://www.american.edu/TED/papua.htm
("cornerstone
of the Papuan
government's economic development policy; environmental protection is seen as a
luxury which cannot be afforded."). Despite the closure of the Bougainville mine,
PNG still has a mineral dependent economy.
119. Augustine Hala, Address at the Indigenous Peoples Workshop: A Case
Study on Indigenous People, Extractive Industries and the New World (April 14,
2003) at 23, available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/prv_

sector/eir/eir internatwshoppngcaseapr03_eng.pdf (describing measures taken
to protect and isolate the valuable mines from Papua New Guinea's indigenous
people).

120. Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Finance, Mining Company Excluded
from the Investment Universe of the Norwegian Government Pension Fund (Apr.
11, 2007), available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/ dep/fin/Press-Center/Press-

releases/2007/Mining-company-excluded-from-the-investm.html?id=46255 1.
DRD Gold currently owns 78.8 per cent of Emperor Mines Limited, which runs the
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in stark contrast to the reaction of the PNG government, which
imposes a minimal fine for contravention of the Environment
Planning Act. 121
2. State Complicity: Unable to Protect
Considering the current resources that the PNG government gives
to regulate the activities of mining companies, they have shown a
complete inability to protect their people. The mining industry
provides a significant portion of the government's budget. PNG's
inability to utilize those funds to protect its citizenry from the
dangers of mining show state complicity amounting to persecution.
In his overview of PNG mining policy, Colin Filer states that:
[T]hose responsible for

. . regulating the mining and

.

petroleum industries now operate with budgets whose real
value has fallen by more than two thirds in the space of a
decade, and whose staffing levels have fallen by half over the
same period ... donor-funded consultants ... cannot readily
create the conditions under which they [the policies] will be
jointly implemented .

.

.

. It is somewhat ironic that

government agencies.., which are responsible for promoting
the industries that generate as much as half of the
government's domestic revenues should now be dependent
on loans and grants
from donor agencies in order to conduct
22
their business.

Tolukuma gold mine on Papua [New] Guinea. Every day the Tolukuma mine disposes
of 430 tonnes tailings into a natural river system ... caus[ing] serious and, extensive
damage to the environment and adversely affects local people's lives and health...
[Tihe company's practice of riverine disposal is in breach of international norms and
..national environmental regulations as well. The ... company ... has been aware
of the serious health and environmental damage its operations have caused, but despite
this the company has failed to put any measures into effect aimed at reducing the
damage. Id.

121. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
[UNESCAP], Development Research and Policy Analysis Division, Integrating
Environmental Considerationsinto Economic Policy Making Process: Background
Readings, ST/ESCAP/1946, Vol. III, 1999, available at http://www.unescap.org/
drpad/publication/integra/volume3/png/3pg3c01.htm (suggesting that Papau New
Guinea's maximum 40,000 kina penalty for violating the Environmental Planning
Act has not provided sufficient deterrence). Note that 40,000 P.N.G. kina is about
U.S. $15,500.
122. Filer & Imbun, supra note 118, at 27.
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This is echoed in the findings of the Development Research and
Policy Analysis Division of the UN Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific when it states that:
[the] effectiveness [of environmental monitoring] is limited
by a lack of: (a) powerful or effective legislation; (b) an
and
integrated approach to legislation, monitoring
enforcement; (c) adequate and realistic penalties; and (d)
financial and human resources for monitoring and enforcing
legislation. 123
In light of the PNG governments' unwillingness and an inability to
offer protection from EML, it is reasonable that Movi is unable and
unwilling to avail himself of his government's protection. It is also
reasonable to conclude that the PNG government would be unwilling
and unable to offer effective assistance to Movi and his community,
were they to attempt to relocate within PNG.
3. The Relevant Question: Does the State Protect?
While it would appear that Movi's assertion that he has a wellfounded fear of persecution is strengthened more by evidence
supporting the claim that the PNG government is unwilling to protect
him, this is not the relevant issue for the Convention definition. The
only significant question is whether or not state protection exists
because "[i]ntention to harm on the part of the state is irrelevant."' 2 4
This was properly expounded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Pitcherskaia v Immigration and Naturalization
Service. "5 That case involved a claim for asylum advanced by a
lesbian woman from Russia who provided evidence that many
lesbians in Russia were involuntarily "treated" in psychiatric
institutions whose methods included the use of electroshock

123. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
[UNESCAP], Development Research and Policy Analysis Division, Integrating
Environmental Considerationsinto Economic Policy Making Process: Background
at
available
Vol.
III,
1999,
ST/ESCAP/1946,
Readings,

http://www.unescap.org/drpad/publication/integra/volume3/png/3pg03c06.htm.
124. Hathaway, supra note 50, at 128.
125. Pitcherskaia v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 118 F.3d 641, 646-47

(9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the refugee is not required to "prove that her
persecutor was motivated by a desire to punish or to inflict fear").
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treatment and sedative drugs. 126 The U.S. Board of Immigration
Appeals found, in error, that because the Russian authorities
"intended to 'cure' her, not to punish her

. . .

their actions did not

constitute persecution."'' 27 In rejecting this finding, the Ninth Circuit
held that the mere fact that an agent of persecution "believes the
harm he is inflicting is 'good for' his victim does not make it any less
painful to victim, or, indeed, remove the conduct from the statutory
' 28

definition of persecution."'

This reasoning is applicable in Movi's case where the ostensible
purpose of the mining is economic growth that will somehow benefit
PNG as a whole and where the unintended consequence is
environmental harm. In these circumstances, Pitcherskaiaprovides a
powerful authority for the notion that even where interference with
the natural environment is engaged in for the ostensible "good of'
the affected community, it may be deemed to be persecutory if that
interference inflicts harm on the community.
Given that intention in relation to harm is irrelevant, the debate
concerning the existence of a dichotomy between the "unable"
versus the "unwilling" issue has now been deemed superfluous, at
least in common law jurisdictions. Correctly, courts in both Canada
and New Zealand have found that "the dichotomy is not supported
2 9
by the text of the Convention or by the relevant authorities."'
Where the local government shows inability, refugee "protection is
denied to the claimant, whereas when the claimant is unwilling, he or
she opts not to approach the state by reason of his or her fear on an
enumerated basis."' 30 State complicity in persecution is not a prerequisite to a valid refugee claim. Therefore, the issue of whether the
state is unwilling to provide protection is not a relevant
consideration. The only relevant question is whether state protection
is effective.
In Movi's case, it is clear that such protection does not exist, even
though it should. Considering Movi's claim as a whole, it is

126. Id. at 644.
127. Id. at 645.
128. Id. at 648.
129. See Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] N.Z.R.S.A.A.
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 719).

130. Id.

59 (citing
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significant that the responsibility of protection from the type of harm
alleged lies squarely at the feet of state. In light of the entrenched
nature of environmental rights and the right to life, states charged
with the duty of protecting the right to life share equally in the
burden of protecting citizens from activities that cause serious
environmental degradation. The following judicial pronouncements
on the subject support the notion that the right to life entails a
corresponding duty on the part of states to take positive measures to
protect its citizens from life-threatening environmental harm. "[I]n
the Yanomami Case, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights found that the Brazilian government's authorization of an
environmentally destructive development in the Yanomami people's
territory constituted a violation of their rights to life, health, and
well-being."13' 1 Similarly, for its part in oil production in Ogoniland,
The African Commission on Human and People's Rights found the
Nigerian Government to be in direct violation of the African Charter
on Human and People's Rights requirement that "all people shall
have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to
their development."' 3 2 The Commission found that this right was
violated by the Nigerian government when it assisted the Nigerian
National Petroleum company in exploiting oil reserves in Ogoniland
while disposing toxic wastes into local waterways.' 3 3

V. CONVENTION GROUNDS: MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
Under the Convention, it is not sufficient to merely establish a well
founded fear of persecution and an inability to avail oneself of the
protection of one's country of origin. The persecution feared must be

131.

Yanomami Case, Case 7615, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24, OEA/Ser.LV/11.66,

doc. 10, rev.
132. See

1 (1985)).

FIFTEENTH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION

ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS 30-44 (2001-2002), available at http://www.
[hereinafter
AFRICAN
achpr.org/english/activityreports/activity 15_en.pdf

(finding the Nigerian government to be in violation of
Articles 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), and 24); see also African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights arts. 2, 4, 14, 16, 18(1), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter
African Charter].
133. See AFRICAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 132.
COMMISSION REPORT]

AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.

[24:31

"for reasons of' a convention ground-in Movi's case, his
34
Membership of a Particular Social Group ("MPSG"). 1
It is widely understood that inclusion of the social group category
into the Convention was intended to encompass those applicants who
might experience persecution on account of unforseen reasons.' 3 5
Very little explanatory material concerning the fifth Convention
ground exists in the drafting history, in the UNHCR guidelines, in
the travaux preparatoires, or in the remarks of Mr. Petren of
Sweden, who proffered the last minute amendment to the Convention
definition. 36 The 2001 San Remo Expert Roundtable1 37 produced
some useful points of consensus, including that MPSG is to be
interpreted independently of the other grounds but is not a "catch-all"
ground intended to render the nexus clause or other grounds
superfluous. 38 Instead, it is clear that "one or more [Convention]
grounds may overlap" in an individual case.' 39 There is no
requirement that there be a voluntary associational relationship
between all of the members of the group, nor is it crucial to establish
"that every member of the group is at risk of persecution."' 4 0 In
addition, decision makers across most jurisdictions agree that while
"persecutory action toward a group may be a relevant factor in

134. See Convention, supra note 5, art. I(A)(2).
135. See Cooper, supra note 81, at 522 n.232 (citing In re Fauziya Kasinga, 21
I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996)) ("stating that the social group category is

purposefully broader than any of the other categories in order to protect against
unforseen persecution").
136. United Nations General Assembly, Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary record of the Third Meeting,

UN. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 at 14. All that is recorded is the Swedish delegate's
statement is as follows: "Experience has shown that certain refugees had been

persecuted because they belonged to particular social groups. The draft Convention
made no provision for such cases, and one designed to cover them should
accordingly be included." Id.
137. Summary Conclusions: Membership of a Particular Social Group, in
UNHCR's GLOBAL
(Erica Feller, Volker

REFUGEE
PROTECTION
IN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW:
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 312-13

TUrk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003).
138. Cf id.

139. Id.
140. Id. As a matter of treaty interpretation, when read in context with the other
Convention grounds it is evident that there is no requirement of cohesion in the
other grounds like political opinion or religion. See id.
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determining the visibility of a group in a particular society,"' 14 1 a
4
group cannot be defined by reference only to fear of persecution. 1
This would involve circular logic, defeating the purpose of the nexus
clause discussed in the next section.
A. PROTECTED CHARACTERISTICS APPROACH
The most detailed jurisprudence concerning the "social group"
category emanates from common law jurisdictions. Currently, there
are two key approaches to the interpretation of MPSG-the "social
perception" approach discussed below and the more dominant
"protected characteristics" approach. The latter, informed by the
principle of ejusdem generis43 has gained acceptance in the United
Kingdom, 1" United States,145 Canada,' 46 and New Zealand.'
According to ejusdem generis, the Convention is concerned with two
particular social groups. The first is united by an immutable
characteristic such as race or nationality. The second is united by a
characteristic that is so fundamental to human dignity that one should
not be asked to change it. This concept was adopted and expanded by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward v. Attorney General of
Canada,where the court distinguished a third category identified by
groups associated by a former voluntary status. The earliest and
leading authority in the U.S. is still Matter of Acosta, 148 which was

141. Id.
142. Ex Parte Shah, (1999) 2 A.C. 629, 643-46 (U.K.H.L.); see also Alexander
Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristicsand Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the
Meaning of Membership of a ParticularSocial Group, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION 263, 267 (Erika Feller, Volker Tfirk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003)
(showing that the JNHCR agrees that "persecution alone cannot determine a
group where none otherwise exists") Id.
143. Ejusdem generis is Latin, meaning of the same kind, and is a principle of
"that when a general word or phrase follows a list of specifics, the general word or
phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type as those listed."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004).
144. See Shah, 2 A.C. at 643-44.
145. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211,212 (BIA 1985).
146. See Ward v. Att'y Gen. of Can., [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
147. Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93 [1995] N.Z.R.S.A.A.
148. 19 I&N Dec. at 212.
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recently affirmed in the case of C.A. v U.S. Attorney General. 49 In
Acosta, the Bureau of Immigration Appeals states:
'persecution on account of [MPSG]' refers to persecution that
is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group
of persons all of whom share a common, immutable
characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate
one such as sex, colour, or kinship ties, or ... it might be a
shared past experience such as former military leadership or
land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic
that will qualify under this construction remains to be
determined on a case-by-case basis . . . By construing
'persecution on account of [MPSG]' in this manner, we
preserve the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals
who are either unable by their own actions, or as a matter of
conscience should not be required, to avoid persecution.'5 °
Proponents of this approach point to its evolutionary nature as well
as the "consistency in decision-making" it affords "because it relies
on clear external standards of reference which are of universal
applicability." 5 ' In meeting the burdens of this approach, Movi can
point to several overlapping characteristics that establish him as a
MPSG. He is a PNG national and one of a population of five
thousand ethnic clan members living in one of a hundred hamlets in
the affected area, downstream from the Auga River.'52 Movi's race,
ethnicity, and nationality are immutable characteristics. He is also a
landowner and subsistence farmer and thereby exposed to
persecution through the mining companies' destruction of his land.
Land ownership is so fundamental to the dignity of Movi and his
indigenous community that he should not be expected to renounce
it.

1 53

149. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006)
(affirming Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006)).
150. Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 23 I&N Dec. 951, 955 (BIA 2006).
151. James Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Membership of a ParticularSocial
Group, 15 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 477, 482 (2003).
152. Hala, supra note 119, at 21-22.
153. Augustine Hala, a member of Tolukuma community, explains that:
"land is our life. Land is our physical life-food and substance. Land is our
social life, it is marriage, it is status, it is security, it is politics, in fact it is our
only life. Tribesmen would rather die to protect their traditional land ....
When you take our land you cut away the heart of our existence. We have
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The fact of Movi's indigenousness and his reliance on the land
mean that he is likely to suffer more than other people as a result of
environmental harm. In the context of environmental threats to
indigenous peoples, "[t]he right to life and the right to security of the
person, paramount in all human rights agreements, are also at issue
in the matter of indigenous communities and the environment. With
threats to the environment... these most basic human rights of selfpreservation are jeopardized."' 5 4 In addition, Movi is poor and
politically disempowered. Environmental refugees tend to belong to
a "group composed of persons lacking political power to protect their
own environment."' 55 While this is certainly true of those people
affected by the TGM, political disempowerment alone would not be
sufficient to establish MPSG, though it is certainly a relevant
characteristic. The Environmental Justice, Movement 56 recognises
environmentally disenfranchised people as a distinct social group
because "environmental hazards disproportionately impact on the
politically disempowered." 57
B. SOCIAL PERCEPTION APPROACH

The "social perception" or sociological approach, which
emphasises the perception of the group by the agents of persecution,
was developed largely in Australia. It looks at whether members of
the group share a common characteristic that sets them apart from
society at large.'58 In Applicant A v Ministerfor Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs, the Australian High Court declared that MPSG
necessitated a group with "a common attribute and a societal
perception that they stand apart."' 5 9 It was similarly adopted by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for Second Circuit's "voluntary associational

little or no experiences of social survival detached from the land. For us, to be

landless is a terrible nightmare ....Id.
at 21.
154. William Andrew Shutkin, The Protection of Indigenous Peoples of the
Earth, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 479, 489 (1991).
155. Cooper, supra note 81, at 522.

156. Id.
at 523 n.237 (noting that the "movement first emerged in the late 1970's
as the linkages between social justice and environmental protection were
recognized").
157. Id. at 523 n.239.
158. See generally Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,
(1997) 190 C.L.R. 225, 254 (Austl.).

159. See id.
at 91-92.
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relationship" standard that also requires that the members of a social
group "must be externally distinguishable." 6 '
In meeting this criterion, Movi could again point to the fact he is
an indigenous clan member, landowner and subsistence farmer.
These attributes, which he shares with the other members of'the
downstream communities, mean that he occupies a distinct position
in PNG society and in the international community. Despite the fact
that "PNG is almost 100 [percent] indigenous, having over 800
different local tribes,"'' 61 the indigenous population is treated unfairly
by the PNG government. This may be a "side effect of ethnocentrism
among the British-trained bureaucrats who run PNG government
from Port Moresby. Some government officials have publicly
described local citizens as incapable of making their own
decisions."'' 62 Much like the PNG government, EML and DRD Gold
have consistently demonstrated a disregard for indigenous
landowners. 163
Proponents of the social perception approach argue that it is
pragmatic in the absence of settled external standards and that it
adheres most rigidly to the terms of the Convention because it is
based on a series of dictionary definitions. 64 While this approach
does, strictly speaking, adhere most rigidly to the language of the
definition it does not take proper account of the object and purpose
of the Convention. The protected characteristics approach however,

160. See Gomez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d
Cir. 1991) (explaining that "[l]ike the traits which distinguish the other four

enumerated categories-race, religion, nationality and political opinion-the
attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and discrete.").
161.

FOREST PEOPLE'S PROGRAMME, A CASE STUDY ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLE,

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND THE WORLD BANK: PAPUA NEW GUINEA 4 (2003).
162. DAVID HYNDMAN, ANCESTRAL RAIN FOREST AND THE MOUNTAIN OF

GOLD: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND MINING IN NEW GUINEA 85 (1994).
163. Beaumont, supra note 13.

"Yet again Papua New Guinea people and their environment have suffered as
a result of an Australian company's bad mining. The cyanide spill from
Tolukuma highlights this company's disregard for the PNG people and their
environment .... It is clear that operations by Australian and other overseas
mining companies in Papua New Guinea are carried out in ways that are
totally unacceptable in the western countries the companies are based in." Id.
164. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 151, at 484.
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gives a meaning to the MPSG ground that is directly in line with the
other four Convention grounds.
Ultimately, Aleinikoff suggests that "[o]ne should conceptualize
the protected characteristics approach as the core of the social
perception analysis. That is, groups that qualify under the protected
characteristics approach are virtually assured recognition under the
social perception test as well."' 65 The UNHCR has recently
attempted to take a similar middle road between the approaches:
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a
common characteristic other than the risk of being
persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by society. The
characteristic will often be one which is innate,
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity,
166
conscience or the exercise of one's human rights.
Whether or not a merger of the approaches will yield significant
benefits for applicants and decision-makers is still unclear and is a
matter that is beyond the scope of this Article. 67 It appears that
Movi, through a combination of a number of characteristics
including other Convention grounds, meets the requirements of both
interpretive approaches for MPSG: he is a member of a group who
share common characteristics such as ethnicity, nationality, poverty,
vocation, disempowerment and connection to the land. These
characteristics make his group distinct in the eyes of his government
and in the eyes of international mining companies that regard him as
inferior.

VI. "FOR REASONS OF," THE NEXUS CLAUSE
The establishment of Movi's MPSG is not sufficient to guarantee
him protection under the Convention. An applicant who is found to

165. Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 300.
166. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on InternationalProtection:
Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/01 7 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees]
(emphasis added).
167. See generally Hathaway & Foster, supra note 151, at 489-91 (providing an
in-depth discussion of the two approaches and whether or not they ought be

merged).
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be outside his country of origin with a well-founded fear of
''persecution" must also demonstrate that the fear of persecution is
causally connected to one or more of the five Convention grounds, in
this case, MPSG. This requirement, emanating from the words "for
reasons of' in the refugee definition, effectively restricts the scope of
the refugee definition such that not all victims of human rights
violations are recognised as refugees. 68 The "nexus" requirement is
the least understood element of the refugee definition. International
jurisprudence is either silent on the issue or adopts 6a9 particular
understanding of the requirement with little explanation. 1
There are, however, several general points of consensus regarding
the operation of this element of the definition. While a complete
analysis of the "nexus" issue is beyond the scope of this work, a
number of issues need to be contemplated where the primary
persecutor is not the state. First, it is not the responsibility of the
applicant to accurately identify the relevant Convention ground that
is connected to the applicant's well-founded fear. 70 That task rests
with the state assessing the claim that can find that a combination of
Convention grounds are causally linked to the risk of persecution.' 7
This is relevant to Movi's claim because in his case, a number of
characteristics and Convention grounds combine. A risk of being
persecuted can be for reasons of MPSG even if not all persons
1 Accordingly, just because Movi
defined by that group are at risk. 72
is identified as politically disempowered does not mean that all
politically disempowered people need to be at risk of persecution for
the nexus condition to be satisfied. It is also unnecessary for a
Convention ground to account for the totality of risk. In Movi's case
it is clear that the persecutors are not solely motivated by the fact that
Movi is a MPSG. Rather, they are primarily motivated by the gold
buried in his land. Nevertheless, this is not an obstacle to recognition
of refugee status.

168. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 166 20; The Michigan
Guidelines,supra note 48, at 213.
169. The Michigan Guidelines, supra note 48, at 211.
170. Id. at213.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 217; U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 166, 31.
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Entire groups may be subject to persecution' 73 so severe that group
membership creates a well-founded fear of persecution. Victims of
environmental harm are assisted by this standard, which would allow
Movi "to claim the agents of persecution target [his] entire racial or
ethnic group and that [his] fear is well-founded based on the general
animus as evidenced by environmental harms inflicted."'174 There is
little doubt that evidence of the intentions of EML and the policies of
the PNG government would provide the requisite evidence of a
nexus. The more relevant question, however, is whether or not
evidence of intention is required at all. 75 As discussed in Part IV, the
intention of the persecutor or the state withholding protection is
irrelevant. There are generally two key contentious aspects of the
necessary nexus: "the relevance of intention and the standard of
causation."176
A. THREE APPROACHES TO INTENTION

Tension exists between jurisdictions that hold that fulfilment of
the nexus clause requires some evidence of the persecutor's intention
and states that take a predicament-of-the-applicant based approach to
interpreting the nexus clause. The former is espoused in the leading
decision of Immigration and NaturalizationService v Elias-Zacarias
where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of the
U.S. requirement that persecution be "on account of' a Convention
ground required evidence of the persecutor's motives. This decision,
which made "motive critical,"' 77 has been clarified somewhat by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case of Pitcherskaia.7 s
The Pitcherskaia court distinguished between the motive of the
persecutor in inflicting harm and the motive of the persecutor in
choosing a target, the latter forming the relevant issue in determining
173. But it is not a requirement that the all members of PSG are exposed to risk.
U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 166, 17.
174. Christopher M. Kozoll, Poisoningthe Well: Persecution, the Environment,
and Refugee Status, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 271, 286 (2004).
175. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 151, at 461.
176. Id.
177. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483
(1991) (arguing that the refugee applicant must provide some evidence, either
direct or circumstantial, of the persecutor's motive).
178. Pitcherskaia v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 118 F.3d 641, 646-47
(9th Cir. 1997).
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the nexus requirement. 79 According to this standard, Movi could
simply point to evidence of where and how EML conduct their mine
operations. They do not use riverine disposal methods in developed
nations where the likely victims would be wealthy, elite, white and
politically empowered and where governments have made riverine
disposal illegal. Indeed, leading mining companies and the World
Bank Group no longer support riverine tailings disposal in their
projects. The method is now only used in PNG. 18 0
The inaction of the PNG government in prohibiting this disposal
method is relevant in an analysis of the nexus clause proffered by the
House of Lords in Shah.' 8' In Shah, concerning two Pakistani
women threatened with violence because of an allegation of adultery,
Lord Hoffman found a combination of two necessary elements were
within the
sufficient to satisfy the meaning of persecution
18 2
agents.
non-state
involving
Convention in cases
First, there is the threat of violence ...

by her husband....

This is a personal affair, directed against them as individuals.
Secondly, there is the inability or unwillingness of the State
to protect them... because they were women. It denied them
against violence which it would have given to
a protection
83
men.

The case stands for the notion that where there is a risk of being
persecuted at the hands of a non-state actor, the causal link is
established, whether or not the absence of state protection is
Convention related. "Alternatively, where the risk of being
179. Id. at 645.
180. See MARTA MIRANDA ET AL., MINING AND CRITICAL ECOSYSTEMS:
MAPPING THE RISKS (World Resources Institute, 2003) 37. DRD recently acquired

a twenty percent share in the Porgera Gold Mine in PNG, one of the largest gold
mines in the country, which also uses the out-moded practice of riverine tailings
disposal. See id. at 38 (noting the destruction that riverine tailings disposal creates
at mining facilities in PNG, especially at the Progera Gold Mine); Press Release,
DRD Gold Ltd., DRD Concludes Acquisition of 20% of Porgera JV (Nov. 24,
http://www.drdgold.com/ir/pressdisplay.asp
at:
available
2003),
?id=101&yr=2003. It should also be noted that riverine tailings disposal is the least
expensive disposal option, requiring only minimal infrastructure. See MIRANDA ET
AL.,

supra note 180, at 37-38.

181. Ex Parte Shah, (1999) 2 A.C. 629, 638 (U.K.H.L.).
182. Edwards, supra note 103, at 62.
183. Shah, 2 A.C. at 653 (emphasis added).
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persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a
Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to
offer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground, the causal
link is 'established."" 4 This bifurcated analysis is in conformity
with the Convention that defines persecution as comprised of
separate but crucial "elements, namely the risk of serious harm and
1 85
failure of protection."
Lord Hoffman's reasoning is illustrative when applied to Movi:
the question, "why was Movi's environment destroyed?" can be
answered, "because the mining company prioritizes profits above the
welfare of poor, indigenous subsistence farmers who reside in a
mineral rich area." However, another answer, the right answer in the
context of Convention, would be, "his environment was ruined by a
company who wanted to extract gold cheaply and who knew that he
would not be protected because he is indigenous, poor and a
subsistence farmer."
Movi could point to evidence outlined in Part IV in support of this
claim. Useful as this evidence may be in furthering Movi's claims, it
is not essential. The correct approach to intention and to the broader
meaning of the nexus clause was presented by Hathaway and Foster
in the form of the question: "'why is the applicant in the predicament
[of being persecuted]?' rather than simply 'why does the persecutor
wish to harm the applicant . . . ?"'I"8 The strongest argument in
favour of this approach is one based on the rules of treaty
interpretation. The reference in the Convention to "being persecuted"
in the passive voice evinces a concern for the "effect that conduct has
on the person being persecuted." '87 Moreover, the object and purpose
of the Convention is to "identity] those to whom surrogate
international protection should be afforded, rather than attributing
guilt or assigning liability to those responsible for inflicting
persecution."' 88 Therefore, as is the case with MPSG, the intention of
the persecutor or the unhelpful state is not a relevant consideration.

184. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 166,
185. Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 302 (citation omitted).
186. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 151, at 467.

21.

187. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v. Kord
[2002] F.C.A. 334 (Austl.) (Heerey, J.).
188. Hathaway & Foster, supra note 151, at 468.
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Clearly, Movi is vulnerable to the threat of "persecution"
discussed in Part IV because he is politically disempowered, poor,
indigenous, and because he relies on the land for his vocation and his
identity. These factors characterize him as a member of PSG and
they cause him to fear persecution because Movi knows that he is
powerless to stop the mine operation or to curtail its devastating
effects. 89
B. STANDARD OF CAUSATION

In cases involving multiple possible explanations for a person's
well-founded fear of persecution, a requisite degree of connection
between the fear and the Convention ground must be established.
Precisely what constitutes the necessary standard of causation has
been the subject of much debate across common law jurisdictions,
most of which is unhelpful. 90 In her examination of causation,
Foster considers the different approaches advanced by different
jurisdictions including the "sole cause" test, the "but for" approach,
the tort based approach and the "predominant cause" test.19'
Ultimately, the appropriate formulation is "a straightforward and
liberal standard of causation, requiring only that the protected ground
constitute a contributing cause or partial reason for the well-founded
fear of persecution."'' 92 This is modified by the reservation that if
"the Convention ground is remote to the point of irrelevance, refugee
status need not be recognized."'' 93 This approach takes into
consideration the humanitarian objectives of the Convention, its
object, purpose, and context. The latter is interestingly explored by a
comparison with the standard established for "well-founded fear"that it is satisfied pursuant to evidence of "reasonable possibility."' 194
An interpretation of the Convention that "requires an applicant to
establish the precise causal role played by a Convention ground is
189. Relevantly, the community petition of 2000 received independent
responses from both the PNG government and TGM. Both responses

independently denied responsibility for the list of grievances contained in the
submissions. See Macdonald, supra note 1, at 10.
190. See generally Michelle Foster, Causation in Contest: Interpreting the
Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 265 (2002).
191. For a detailed analysis of all approaches see id. at 269-88.
192. Id. at 340.
193. Id. at 339.

194. See id. at 337.
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inconsistent with a proper application of the 'well founded fear' test
in that it requires a degree of certainty that travels well beyond the
'likelihood' standard specified in the text.195 The characteristics that
make up Movi's MPSG contribute to his fear of persecution. He
depends entirely on his land for survival and yet he is powerless to
stop EML from polluting it. His powerlessness, resulting from the
fact that he is a subsistence farmer and an ethnic clan member
combined with the disregard shown to his community by EML,
would cause Movi to fear further harm.

CONCLUSION
Movi's situation meets the criteria set out in the Convention
definition. This Article has demonstrated that grave environmental
harm can be persecutory when it is inflicted because of a devaluation
of the lives of those affected. An applicant who can show
deliberately inflicted, severe environmental harm in the absence of
state protection will have a strong claim to refugee status pursuant to
an evolutionary interpretation of the current Convention definition.
In light of this application signatory states will be unable to ignore
claims based on environmental harm by maintaining that they do not
fit within the existing definition. Movi and others like him, if they
are able to leave their countries of origin, are deserving of
protections afforded to recognised refugees under the Convention.
At the commencement of this work, reference was made to the
growing number of so-called "environmental refugees." Whether the
argument presented in this Article could encompass this entire group
is highly questionable. However, in light of the looming
environmental refugee crisis, there will be increasing demands
placed on international refugee law. This analysis presents a first step
towards meeting those demands. It is only a beginning, but an
important beginning if the Convention is to remain viable and
relevant to contemporary refugee flows.

195. Id. (citations omitted).

